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THE TIME IS NIGH: A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
PATENT SYSTEM
BEN MCENIERY*
ABSTRACT
The world is slowly but inexorably moving towards adopting an
integrated global patent system. It is inevitable that the present inefficient
and splintered system in which patents must be separately obtained and
enforced in each nation state must evolve to make obtaining global patent
protection an achievable proposition for those other than just the wealthiest
multinational corporations. The global patent system proposed in this article
allows a patent applicant to file a single patent application in an
international patent office, have that patent application examined in
accordance with a uniform patentability standard, and results in the grant
of a unitary patent that is enforceable in all member states. The proposed
system differs significantly from previous proposals for a global patent
system because it calls for matters of patent enforcement to remain the
exclusive domain of member states and their courts rather than calling for
the creation of an international patent court to hear infringement suits. This
aspect of the proposal makes it a viable alternative to the current system
because it allows nation states to retain a degree of sovereignty and control
over the patents that are enforced in their territories, while embracing the
substantive and procedural efficiencies concomitant with a truly integrated
global patent system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite 150 years of admirable international consensus, the global
patent system remains an inefficient collection of national patent systems
and national laws. In this disjointed system, patents and national patent
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systems are firmly territorial in nature. Nations independently create and
enforce their own national patent laws, maintain independent national patent
offices, examine patent applications and grant their own national patents.
Other than by some regional patent agreements, the norm is that patents for
inventions are only protected in countries where a patentee has filed a patent
application and where a patent has been granted. Outside those countries the
patentee has no protection from imitators. Further, a patent holder must
enforce each distinct national patent country by country, which is complex,
incredibly costly and time-consuming.1
This fragmentation is the natural consequence of a global political and
economic system that values national sovereignty most highly. Although the
various harmonization efforts that have taken place in the last 150 years have
ensured that the concepts of patentability are largely similar around the
world, there remains a significant lack of uniformity in countries’ substantive
patent law and patent practice. While the content of a nation’s patent laws is
largely dictated by the various international treaties and conventions that
impose minimum standards of intellectual property protection, those treaties,
for the most part, describe conceptual norms in broad terms that lack
prescription as to the detail or means by which they are to be implemented
in legislation. Nation states and their legislatures, therefore, retain a
significant freedom in deciding how the minimum standards dictated by
international law are enacted in domestic law. These freedoms have been
necessary to achieve consensus between nation states to negotiate complex
international treaties, and are a recognition of the fact that different
circumstances have necessitated that different standards be applied to suit
local conditions in various places. However, they also create injustices for
patent applicants and patentees, whose rights are often smothered by the
sheer cost of engaging with the system. The territorial nature of patents
causes unnecessary duplication of effort, both on the part of patentees and
national patent offices. This duplication in turn imposes exorbitant costs on
those who seek to patent in multiple countries and enforce patents when they
are infringed. Patent applicants pay filing fees and maintenance fees in each
jurisdiction in which protection is sought, along with the legal costs
associated with preparing and prosecuting each patent application. Then
there are the exorbitant costs of bringing infringement actions in multiple

1. Kevin P. Mahne, A Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court for the European Union: An
Analysis of Europe’s Long Standing Attempt to Create a Supranational Patent System, 94 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 162, 163 (2012); John H. Barton, Issues Posed By A World Patent System, 7 J.
INT’L. ECON. L. 341, 352 (2004); MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT 82 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
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jurisdictions. The current system also imposes the significant costs of
running patent offices on nation states.
Since the domestic patent laws of nation states are not uniform, patent
applications are often tailored to take account of local legal or procedural
idiosyncrasies when patents for an invention are sought in different places.
As such, patent applications in respect of the same invention filed in different
places are rarely identical (which involves incurring additional costs in each
jurisdiction in which the patent application is modified), and prior art
searches and examinations of those patents will rarely be identical, but the
differences will be in substance immaterial.2
A recent collection of disputes between Apple Inc. and Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd conducted before the courts in the United States, South
Korea, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan and Australia
and other places highlights the problem inherent in the need to enforce
patents separately in each jurisdiction. The high cost of obtaining and
enforcing parallel national patents runs contrary to the public interest
because it is a disincentive to innovate. An inventor who is concerned about
his or her invention being commercialized by others in countries where he
or she cannot afford to secure a patent may be reluctant to disclose the
invention in any country, and may instead rely on trade secrets to maintain
exclusivity in the invention, thereby depriving the public of any disclosure
of the invention and its workings. Alternatively, he or she may refuse to
disclose or even use the invention entirely, or opt to not invent at all in favor
of pursuing other activities. In many cases, those costs are a deterrent to
would-be inventors. When inventors can afford to patent, the costs are passed
on to consumers.
The high costs of obtaining and enforcing patents in multiple
jurisdictions takes the prospect of getting patent protection in more than a
handful of countries out of the reach of the vast majority of individuals and
SMEs. As a result, global patent protection is in most cases only within the
reach of the best-resourced multinationals.3 In most instances, patent
applicants seek patents in only a small number of countries. Although the
decision as to which jurisdictions a patentee will seek to patent in will be
subject to many factors, including what the invention is and what production
capacity competitors may have in particular jurisdictions, the marginal cost
of seeking to patent in additional jurisdictions will be a factor in many cases.
2. Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now - The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C.J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 291 (1995).
3. Michael N. Meller, Planning for a Global Patent System, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
379, 380 (1998).
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Those patent applicants who seek patents for the same invention in multiple
countries file on average in fewer than four countries. 4
The duplication inherent in national patent offices separately examining
patent applications contributes to patents that fail to satisfy the statutory
requirements of novelty or inventive step being improperly granted.5 Patent
offices in countries that actually examine patent applications before granting
patents have been criticized for failing to provide their examiners with
sufficient time and incentives to properly examine patents. 6
There are, however, some exceptions to the patent system’s
territorialism. The first is that a few nations have formed patent communities,
whereby a patent granted in one community nation is valid in all other
community nations. One example is the Switzerland-Liechtenstein Patent
Cooperation Treaty, a bilateral treaty that provides common legislation in
the field of patents for Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The two countries
constitute a single patent area; a Swiss patent is effective in Liechtenstein
and vice-versa. Another notable example is the African Intellectual Property
Organization (OAPI) Agreement. The agreement created a single patent area
among French-speaking nations in Africa. Any patent application filed in a
member state or the regional patent office created by the agreement is treated
as the equivalent of a national filing in each and every member state. Finally,
mention should be made of the proposed European Unitary Patent scheme,
which allows for a single unitary patent enforceable in all participating EU
states that are parties to the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court. 7
Trimble posits that there are a number of economic and social realities
that counter any perceived need to maintain the strict territoriality of patents.
These are that industrialization has spread to all parts of the world; the world
is much more interconnected in that trade crosses borders and the Internet
facilitates rapid exchanges of information; and policy making is departing
from a strictly territorial framework. 8 Similarly, Khoury has opined that we
are already moving away from a strict territoriality and as such we have
witnessed the end of the national patent office in its conventional form
4. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, PATENT COOPERATION TREATY YEARLY
REVIEW: THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 15 (Brenda O’Hanlon, 2016).
5. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 137
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, Post-Grant Review of Patents:
Enhancing the Quality of the Fuel of Interest, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 231, 232 (2003).
6. Id.
7. European Comm’n, UNITARY PATENT, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectualproperty/patents/unitary-patent_en (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
8. See MARKETA TRIMBLE, Preface to GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1 at vii.
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because it is no longer compatible with the cross-border characteristics of
innovation and the way inventions are now being patented, protected, and
enforced.9
The proposal contained in this article advocates the breakdown of this
territorialism and is the next logical step in a natural progression that builds
upon the significant steps that have been taken already towards achieving a
global system.
The history of patent law has arguably always been one of international
integration and harmonization. Its beginnings lie in nation states noting the
benefits of other countries’ patent systems and adopting similar systems of
their own.10
The first steps towards a world or global patent system were taken by
those who instigated the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property.11 The Paris Convention (the world’s first intellectual
property treaty) established a priority system that made it easier to apply for
patent protection on a country-by-country basis.12 It arose as a result of
foreign exhibitors being unwilling to exhibit their inventions at the
International Exposition of 1873 in Vienna because they believed they would
not receive legal protection from imitators.13 Prior to the Paris Convention,
inventors needed to arrange to simultaneously submit patent applications in
each country in which they sought protection, otherwise the first application
submitted would destroy the novelty in any subsequently submitted
applications.14 The Paris Convention was initially adopted by eleven
countries,15 and its membership has since grown to 176 countries and
includes all the world’s industrialized nations and nearly all developing
nations.16
9. Amir H. Khoury, The End of the National Patent Office, 52 IDEA 199, 202 (2012).
10. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685,
710-12 (2002).
11. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art.1, Mar. 20, 1883, last revised July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
12. Id. at art.4.
13. Warren S. Wolfeld, Note, International Patent Cooperation: The Next Step, 16 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 229, 235 (1983).
14. Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX A.D., 38 IDEA 529,
532.
15. The original signatories to the Paris Convention were Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland.
16. For a list of all nation states that are contracting parties to the Paris Convention, see States Party
to the PCT and the Paris Convention and Members of the World Trade Organization,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct_paris_wto.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2016)
[hereinafter Paris Convention Parties]. As Von Holstein has noted, given that the Paris Convention
originated at a time when nation states jealously guarded their national sovereignty, the formation and
wide adoption of the Paris Convention is a remarkable feat: Von Holstein, International Cooperation in
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By 1970 the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) was introduced to
provide a simplified means of obtaining global patent protection or patent
protection in a multitude of countries. Although it does not lead to an
international patent, the PCT allows a patent applicant to file a single patent
application to commence the process of obtaining patent rights in any
number of the PCT’s 150 member states. 17 The result is a collection of
national (or regional) patents in the jurisdictions in which patents are granted,
all of which must be separately maintained and enforced. The PCT also
provides for preliminary search and examination of the application, which
gives an applicant a preliminary opinion as to whether the invention sought
is patentable.
Of recent notable interest is the considerable number of collaborative
Patent Prosecution Highway (“PPH”) programs that have been established
between national and regional patent offices for the purpose of sharing and
relying on each other’s search and examination results. These programs,
usually bilateral, are created with the aim of reducing the time taken to
examine patent applications and the backlog of pending applications in many
patent offices around the world.18
While these, and other initiatives, are steps in the right direction, what
is needed is a bold jump from nationally-focused systems to true
international integration. Such an outcome could only be achieved by way
of countries voluntarily agreeing to the terms of a multilateral international
agreement.
II. THE PROPOSAL IN BRIEF
It is proposed that the current fragmented and inefficient system by
which a multiplicity of separate national patents is applied for, examined and
enforced in respect of the same invention in many nation states be replaced
by a genuinely international patent system. In pursuance of this objective, it
is proposed that all member states to a new international treaty cease granting
national patents and instead recognize the validity of a unitary patent of
global effect issued by an international patent office.
The main goals of this proposal are to reduce the duplication of effort
and expense involved in nation-states maintaining parallel national or
regional patent systems, to improve patent quality, to consolidate the
collection and disclosure of state-of-the-art technical patent information in
the Field of Patent Law with Special Reference to the Activities of the Council of Europe, 16 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 191, 193-94 (1967).
17. Paris Convention Parties, supra note 16.
18. See U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN (2003); Alicia
Pitts & Joshua Kim, Patent Prosecution Highway: Is Life in the Fast Lane Worth the Cost, 1 HASTINGS
SCI. & TECH. L. J. 127, 127 (2009).
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one place, to achieve substantive law harmonization in respect of
patentability and patent enforcement, and to address difficulties a patent
holder faces when seeking to enforce patent rights in many jurisdictions.
While the proposal would require nation states to sacrifice a portion of their
national sovereignty in respect of patents, it is argued that this sacrifice is
essential to remove unnecessary inefficiencies present in the current system
and bring the benefits of global patent protection within the reach of those
other than just the wealthiest and best resourced multinational corporations.
There are four principal parts to the proposal.
At the heart of the proposal is a unitary international patent, to be known
simply as an International Patent, the validity of which will be recognized in
all member states that are signatories to a treaty giving effect to this proposed
international patent system (the “International Patent Treaty”). The proposal
involves a patent applicant filing a single patent application (an
“International Patent Application”), which would lead directly to a single
substantive examination by an appropriately resourced central international
patent office (known as the “International Patent Office”).
Furthermore, a review panel of the International Patent Office would,
to the exclusion of member states, have sole power to centrally administer
all pre-grant opposition and post-grant revocation challenges (with rights of
appeal to the International Patent Court). The exclusion of national patent
offices and national courts from these processes ensures that the result of any
post-acceptance or post-grant challenge to a patent’s validity is given effect
in all member states and remains uniform across the globe.
Having patents examined only by a single central patent office removes
the unnecessary duplication that occurs at present when national patent
offices independently examine parallel patent applications filed in various
nation states in respect of the same invention. More importantly, it has the
potential to ensure sufficient resources (in terms of time, expertise and access
to repositories of prior art) are devoted to ensuring that patent examination
is done as well as it can be, to limit the granting of bad patents that are invalid
for want of novelty, inventive step, or sufficient disclosure. This approach
also has the potential to greatly reduce the filing, examination, maintenance
and other associated fees currently borne by patent applicants. By
streamlining the process in this way, it is anticipated that the cost of obtaining
an International Patent could be comparable to that of obtaining a small
number of national patents and that the on-going cost of maintaining the
International Patent Office be met through patent filing and maintenance
fees.
The second part of the proposal concerns the substantive law
harmonization necessary to sustain a single unitary patent and a single patent
office that conducts all patent examinations. What is proposed in this regard
is that the International Patent Treaty create a single test for patentability in
line with the requirements presently set out in Article 27 of the TRIPS
Agreement, but that it also permit member states to legislate that patents for
certain classes of invention (to be set out in a list permitted patentable subject
matter exclusions) are not enforceable in their jurisdictions. This allows
member states to retain control over the classes of invention that are
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protected by patents in their territories and to create subject matter exclusions
over things like business schemes, computer programs and methods of
treating the human body. This mechanism is a necessary means of
accommodating the variety of disparate interests of the developed and
developing nations that will be among the member states.
The third part of this proposal differs significantly from previous
proposals for a global patent system. It is proposed that matters of patent
enforcement remain the exclusive domain of member states and their courts.
As such, it is not proposed that the International Patent Court have a role in
patent infringement proceedings. The key to this aspect of the proposal is
that it takes advantage of the proposed substantive law harmonization. This
substantive law harmonization makes practicable the hearing of cross-border
patent disputes in a single nation’s courts, rather than a multiplicity of
enforcement proceedings being heard in parallel in different national courts.
The fourth, and perhaps the most controversial aspect of this proposal
(and its main barrier to being implemented), is that it recommends an
international patent system that has English as its one and only official
language. This choice has been made because it is predicted that automated
language translation tools will be developed to a point where they can be
relied on to accurately translate the complex and detailed technical language
of patent specifications by the time any international treaty implementing the
proposal can be agreed upon and implemented.
This proposal not only removes the difficulties associated with the need
for patent applications to be separately examined in each county in which the
applicant seeks patent protection, but also purports to address the difficulties
a patent holder faces when seeking to enforce patent rights in many
jurisdictions. Importantly, this proposal does not advocate for an
international patent court capable of hearing patent infringement actions,
which is arguably too much of an interference with national sovereignty.
The barriers that stand in the way of the establishment of the proposed
integrated international patent system are significant, but not
insurmountable. The most significant barrier, as noted above, is the choice
of English as the one and only language of the International Patent Office.
Another likely impediment is the reluctance of nation states to
relinquish the national sovereignty that gives them strong control over the
processes by which patents are granted, refused and otherwise administered
within their borders.19 This reluctance, coupled with the competing interests
of various nation states (particularly the competing interests of developed
and developing countries) is perhaps a reason why different countries have
different national patent laws today. Barriers of this kind are not peculiar to
patent law, but arise in respect of proposals to harmonize other fields such
as environmental law, laws regulating the safety and sale of pharmaceuticals,
and international trade law. 20

19. Anthony D. Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization, 22 N.
KY. L. REV. 579, 584 (1995).
20. Id. at 580.
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Another potential barrier lies in likely objections from those in
countries where most inventors do not seek patents. By signing up to a global
patent system, they will be subject to patents they would not otherwise have
been subject to. Due to the existing cost of patenting in multiple jurisdictions,
in some places patents are not routinely sought and people are ordinarily free
to imitate in those jurisdictions, provided the technology necessary to exploit
the patent exists in those places. This is a freedom that will be lost with the
introduction of a unitary international patent. The counter argument is that
the people in many of these countries may not have the capacity to exploit
the inventions described in most patents independently of the patentee, and
would not even hear of the invention in the absence of a patentee bringing
that invention into their country.
Finally, opposition to the proposal can be expected from those with
vested interests, such as patent agents and attorneys whose business models
depend on the structures and institutions of the current international patent
system. Removing the need to tailor and prosecute local national patent
applications will reduce the work of those in the patent agent and attorney
professions, particularly the lucrative work of acting as a foreign filing agent
when a patent attorney in another country has created the patent application.
III. THE PROPOSAL IN DETAIL
This proposal aims to take the best elements of existing national patent
systems and international treaties and adapt them to the needs of an
integrated global system, while seeking to observe the need to accommodate
disparate interests of nation states at different stages of development.
Importantly in this regard, the resulting institutions must be independent.
They must not be, or be seen to be, tools for furthering the interests of a
particular regional constituency.
A. A Unitary International Patent Issued by an International Patent Office
The centerpiece of the proposal is that all member states delegate to the
International Patent Office the exclusive power to grant patents that are of
global effect.
The proposal requires that a patent applicant file a single International
Patent Application with the International Patent Office. This would lead
directly to a substantive examination by the International Patent Office and
the grant of a unitary International Patent, the validity of which would be
recognized in all member states upon grant. The proposal further requires
that the International Patent Office determine any challenges to the validity
of an International Patent to the exclusion of member states. The grant of an
International Patent would not result in the creation of a bundle of national
patents like that which results from an application made pursuant to the
European Patent Convention or the Patent Cooperation Treaty. The main
difference in this regard is that the proposed international patent be a unitary
patent whose validity is recognized by each nation state, but which can only
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be enforced in that courts of each member state individually, and can only
be revoked by application to the International Patent Office.
It is proposed that by eliminating the expense required to maintain
parallel national patent systems, it would be possible to re-conceptualize
patent examination by mandating that more time be devoted to identifying
relevant prior art and that examination be a collaborative exercise between
patent examiners. Consolidating examination in one office eliminates the
possibility that exists currently of national patent offices achieving
inconsistent results when examining the same or practically identical parallel
patent applications in respect of a single invention.
The proposed international patent system would also have the
advantage of consolidating state of the art technological patent information
in one place. All patent applications and patent specifications would be
published on the International Patent Office’s publicly accessible patent
database. Presently, the state of the art technological information contained
in patent specifications is scattered all over the world in patent databases
operated by national or regional patent offices, some of which are more
accessible than others. In addition, the proposal will necessarily require
patent examiners to access a single electronic database of prior art to search.
This would involve linking the databases of existing nation patent offices to
create a global database of shared information.21
The term of an International Patent will be 20 years, measured from the
date a non-provisional (or complete) application is filed, which is presently
the international norm established by the TRIPS Agreement. 22 In the absence
of compelling reasons, it would seem that this term ought to be retained. The
system should allow for extensions of the patent term for patents on
pharmaceuticals to compensate patentees for the time taken to obtain
regulatory approvals needed before a pharmaceutical substance can be sold
to the public.23 The allowable extension of the patent term should be for a
period of up to five years.
Obtaining an International Patent begins with a patent application (an
“International Patent Application”) being filed with the International Patent
Office and accompanied by the requisite filing fee. All patent application
filings are to be electronic, and must be capable of being filed by patent
attorney agents and members of the public. The application must contain an
abstract, a specification and claims, as is required for patent applications in
every country in the world today.24
The proposal adopts the current approach that allows applicants to
obtain an earlier priority date by filing a provisional application and maintain

21. Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia?, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 515, 516
(2003).
22. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S 299, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
23. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act),
Pub. L. No 98-417, §201 (1984) (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. §156(a)(4)).
24. Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 3, Jun. 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
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the application so long as a complete application is filed within 12 months
of the provisional. 25
The International Patent Office will, with necessary modifications,
adopt the patent classification system administered pursuant to the
Strasbourg Agreement and the microorganism deposit system of the
Budapest Treaty.
1. A single centralized publication
In accordance with the current norm,26 the International Patent
Application, including the patent specification it contains, will be published
18 months after the application is filed, or earlier if the applicant asks that
the application be published before this time.27 The application will be
published on a publicly available online database maintained by the
International Patent Office. This database must be easily searchable and
accessible free-of-charge.
The English-language specification will be published on the
International Patent Office’s web site, along with machine translations in
every language nominated by member states. Although translations of the
application will be published, it is the English language application that
remains the official application that is used in all dealings with the
International Patent Office. The translations, however, will be used in
infringement and non-infringement proceedings in national courts where the
language used is not English. The translations need to be made available at
this time because it would be inequitable for the system to allow a patent
written in English to be enforced in a jurisdiction where English is not an
official language. It might also be problematic for the courts to interpret a
document in a foreign language that is the source of proprietary rights. Patent
applicants must have the option to file their own translations to replace
machine translations if they are not satisfied with a machine translation
produced by the International Patent Office.
It is disclosure of the patent specification through publication that gives
effect to the patent applicant’s obligation to disclose the invention being
patented.28 Presently, when an applicant seeks patent protection in one or
more patent offices without filing in all countries, publication of the patent
specification by one of those patent offices effectively discloses the
invention everywhere in the world. This is so even though the patentee’s
monopoly is only enforceable within the territorial borders of the country or
countries in which a patent has been granted, whereas the information
disclosed knows no borders. Previously language and isolation were more
effective in locking information in one place and industrial capabilities

25. Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. 4. An applicant who files a provisional application must
file a corresponding non-provisional (or complete) application within 12 months, otherwise the
application lapses irretrievably (no extensions of time being permitted).
26. Duffy, supra note 10, at 715-716.
27. Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 24, art. 21(2)(b).
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 122.
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limited the number of countries in which the invention could be practiced.
Now the reproductive capabilities, accessibility and reach of the Internet
really do mean that publication is global.
The second function of the disclosure of a patent application is that it
marks the start of the period during which the patentee can enforce rights of
exclusivity. A patentee can sue in respect of any act that takes place from the
time the application is published, but cannot commence infringement
proceedings until the patent has been granted (which will not occur until after
a substantive examination has been performed). It is proposed that the
International Patent operate in the same way. That is, the holder of an
International Patent will be permitted to sue in respect of any act that takes
place from the time the specification contained in an International Patent
Application is published, but cannot commence infringement proceedings in
a national court until an International Patent is granted. Having a unitary
international patent means that the patentee’s period of exclusivity in the
invention begins at the same time everywhere in the world.
2. Examination
To ensure there is efficient use of the examiners’ time, International
Patent Applications will not be examined unless and until the applicant has
requested an examination. In the same way that not all national patents
proceed to examination, not all International Patent Applications will be
examined. There are various reasons why a patent application might not
proceed to examination. It might be the case that the applicant has run out of
money and can no longer afford to prosecute the application. Alternatively,
the invention may have been superseded by better or cheaper substitutes. If
an examination is not requested within five years of the International Patent
Application having been filed, the application lapses irretrievably.
There must be a means by which an applicant can request an expedited
examination to obtain an International Patent quickly, say if the applicant
wishes to prosecute infringement proceedings promptly or wishes to have
certainty in its proprietary rights for the purpose of licensing or other
commercial purposes.
One aspect of the proposed system is to improve patent quality by
ensuring appropriate resources (in terms of time, expertise and access to
repositories of prior art) are directed to patent examination. One way to
achieve this would be for patents to be examined by two or more teams of
patent examiners working in competition. Examiners grouped in teams
would work collaboratively to identify prior art and test the alleged invention
against that prior art. Teams of examiners working competitively against one
another will more likely produce “better” or more accurate results than
examiners working in isolation with less incentive to produce the best results
they can achieve.29

29. Duffy, supra note 10, at 707.
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3. Pre-grant and post-grant opposition
Acceptance (otherwise known as allowance), and publication of that
acceptance, follows examination and precedes a pre-grant opposition period
and a formal grant of an International Patent. Acceptance occurs when the
patent examiners raise no further objections to the International Patent
Application. Once an International Patent Application is accepted, a notice
to that effect is published. A three-month pre-grant opposition period
commences on publication of that notice. During that time, anyone who
objects to the grant of an International Patent for the invention on the ground
that the invention does not satisfy the international patentability
requirements may commence an opposition proceeding by giving notice to
the International Patent Office. Where the application survives any pre-grant
opposition challenge or no such challenge is brought, an International Patent
will be granted.
As is currently the case with national patents, the grant of an
International Patent shall be a prima facie indication of its validity, but not a
guarantee. Post-grant opposition can be instigated by anyone who seeks
revocation of an International Patent after it has been granted. Appeals from
the International Patent Office’s decisions on both pre-grant and post-grant
opposition can be appealed to the International Patent Court, whose decision
as to patentability is final.
Where the validity of an International Patent is challenged in
infringement proceedings before a national court, the invalidity claim must
be referred to the International Patent Office for adjudication and the national
court proceedings are to be stayed until a decision on the claim for revocation
is handed down.
4. The International Patent Court
The proposed International Patent Court is to function as an appeal
court with a discrete and limited, but exclusive, jurisdiction. Its sole role is
to consider appeals from the International Patent Office on pre-grant and
post-grant oppositions. To be clear, the International Patent Court is to have
no role in patent infringement proceedings or in actions in which a
declaration of non-infringement is sought, as those matters remain the
province of national legal systems. Thus, unlike in the European system,
there is no scope in this proposal for an appeal from a court at the apex of
the court hierarchy of a national legal system to a supranational court.
Appeals from decisions of the International Patent Office shall be
reviewed de novo, such that fresh evidence may be tendered. Proceedings of
the court shall be conducted in English, the language of the proposed
International Patent system. It is expected that the International Patent Court
will operate more efficiently and deliver decisions more quickly than the
courts in many member states. The International Patent Court’s decisions as
to patentability are final and subject only to any appeal to the Appeal
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Division of that court. Given the court’s exclusive jurisdiction in this regard,
national courts will have no power to decide questions of patent validity or
to review decisions of the International Patent Office.
Investing a court with these kinds of limited and specific powers is not
without precedent. For instance, German law does not provide a procedural
means for initiating a claim or a counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity
in regular courts.30 A German patent’s validity may only be challenged in a
proceeding before the German Patent and Trademark Office (the Deutsches
Patent und Merkenamet),31 appeals from which lie to the German Federal
Patent Court (the Bundespatentgericht). 32 The German Federal Patent Court
only hears appeals of this kind and has no role to play in infringement
proceedings.
If the validity of an International Patent is at issue in a national court,
the court will be empowered to grant a stay of its proceeding to allow a
challenge to the patent’s validity to proceed before the International Patent
Court, if the national court considers that the challenge appears to have merit.
If the court takes the view that the invalidity claim lacks merit, it will refuse
to grant a stay and will continue to determine the infringement proceeding.
It is not proposed that the International Patent Court be comprised of
divisions to service various regions around the world. What is proposed is a
single court located in one place. The location of the International Patent
Court (and its Registry) shall be agreed on by the member states. The
location of the Registry shall be largely immaterial because all
communications with the Registry and filings shall be conducted
electronically. The advantage in having a single court without regional
divisions is that the court will more likely produce uniformity in its decisions
and its application of the patentability standards, rather than regional
peculiarities. This in turn will preclude forum shopping by patent applicants
who might choose a division of the court in which to file.
The international body that administers the International Patent Treaty
shall appoint judges that sit on the International Patent Court. These judges
shall be drawn from the ranks of patent specialist jurists from national courts
and must have an excellent command of the English language.
Parties before the International Patent Court may appear in person or be
represented by lawyers authorized to practice before a court of a member
state or alternatively by a patent attorney or patent agent entitled to practice
30. MARKETA TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 69.
31. See DEUTSCHES PATENT UND MERKENAMET, http://www.dpma.de (last visited Dec. 11, 2014).
32. See BUNDES PATENT GERICHT, https://www.bundespatentgericht.de/cms/ (last visited Dec. 11,
2014).
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in a member state. Video and telephone conferencing facilities should be
available to facilitate hearings (as is available for hearings before most
national patent offices). Corporate entities may be represented by an
employee or officer.
It is expected that law firms and patent attorney firms will respond to
this structure by opening offices in the location of the International Patent
Court or enter into agreements with affiliates that have offices where the
International Patent Court is located.
5. Peer-to-Patent-style third party contributions
To leverage the best available resources to improve patent quality, a
further aspect of the proposal is a Peer-to-Patent-style third party notification
system, the purpose of which is to allow and encourage citizen-experts to put
relevant prior art references before patent examiners.
Peer to Patent is a means by which a community of self-selecting
volunteers can work collaboratively to identify prior art relevant to selected
pending patent applications. Those communities of citizen-experts use an
online forum to read pending patent applications, search for and identify
relevant prior art documents, and submit relevant prior art to a national patent
office. The most relevant prior art documents selected by the community are
then placed before the examiner to be used to assist the examination. The
input of these third party citizen-experts can be of great value in improving
patent quality because it has the potential to bring relevant prior art to the
attention of examiners who might not otherwise locate it. 33
To date the various Peer to Patent projects have operated in conjunction
with national patent offices and have sought input from the community on
various patent applications before those national offices. The International
Patent System proposed presents an opportunity to consolidate those
communities of citizen experts that have hitherto been organized along
national lines and focus them on the task of locating prior art relevant to one
set of patent applications. This will remove the possibility of different
national Peer to Patent projects duplicating effort in conducting prior art
searches in respect of the same invention claimed in different jurisdictions,
and remove the difficulties of maintaining a critical mass of peer reviewers. 34
As such, to take full advantage of the opportunities for public review
that are available, it is proposed that the International Patent System
described in this article must allow third party Peer to Patent style
contributions. The proposal thus involves the International Patent Office
33. See generally BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE
GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL (Brookings Inst. Press
2009); Beth Simone Noveck, ‘Peer to Patent’: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform,
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 158 (2006).
34. For an example of Peer to Patent projects, see generally Brian Fitzgerald et al., Peer-To-Patent
Australia: First Anniversary Report, QUEENSLAND U. OF TECH. 1 (Dec. 2010),
http://www.peertopatent.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/11/P2PAU_1st_Anniversary_Report.pdf.
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creating a means by which third party volunteers are permitted to make prior
art submissions online that will be put before and considered by the
examiners during examination. It is also proposed that prior art submissions
be permitted for the use in both pre- and post-grant opposition proceedings
before the International Patent Office.
B. Substantive Law Harmonization and a Single Centralized Examination
Having a single unitary patent and a single international patent office to
conduct all patent examinations requires substantive law harmonization of
patentability requirements and the law in respect of infringement and
remedies. However, in order to achieve the consensus needed to bring this
proposal to fruition, it is necessary that member states be permitted to retain
a degree of flexibility in regard to the divisive issue of the scope of patentable
subject matter.
1. Harmonization of patentability requirements
What is proposed in this regard is that the International Patent Treaty
create a single test for patentability in line with the requirements presently
set out in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, but that it also permit member
states to legislate that patents for certain classes of invention (to be set out in
a list permitted patentable subject matter exclusions) are not enforceable in
their jurisdictions. That is, subject matter exclusions are to be applied at the
national level during infringement proceedings, and not at the international
level during examination.
Article 27.1 provides that, subject to certain exceptions, “patents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application.” Thus, it is proposed that the International
Patent Office examine an International Patent Application to test whether the
invention is novel, involves an inventive step (non-obviousness), and is
capable of industrial application (utility), in addition to the requirements that
the invention falls within the bounds of patentable subject matter and that the
invention is sufficiently disclosed in the patent specification.
Insofar as patentable subject matter is concerned, it is proposed that the
International Patent Office apply a broad and unrestricted subject matter
eligibility threshold similar to that observed in United States law. In this
regard, it is proposed that the International Patent Treaty define the scope of
patentable subject matter in terms that reflect the sentiment expressed in
Diamond v Chakrabarty that patentable subject matter comprises “anything
under the sun that is made by man.” 35
However, it is also proposed that member states retain the right to
legislate to not allow certain classes of invention to be enforced within their
territories. These classes of permissible excluded matter will be identified in
35. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6 (1952)).
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the International Patent Treaty, and would necessarily include (to list a few)
business methods, human beings and other living organisms, genes,
computer software, and methods of medical treatment and diagnosis. In
short, this aspect of the proposal allows member states the freedom to
implement domestic laws that, while not denying an International Patent’s
validity, make certain classes of International Patent not enforceable in their
territories.
This would seem to be a key element in achieving international
consensus as it allows member states to retain control of potentially dealbreaking issues of patentable subject matter in a way that serves the interests
of both developed and developing countries. 36 By leaving these kinds of
possibly divisive patentable subject matter issues to national legislatures and
courts, there is scope for allowing recognition of particular national or
regional interests, making the proposal more likely to achieve consensus.
This approach involves the application of the broadest conception of
patentable subject matter at the international level, which means that many
of the difficult and contentious patent eligibility cases like those considered
in Bilski v. Kappos,37 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and Alice Corp v. CLS
Bank,38 will in the future be determined by the International Patent Office
according to an international patentability standard set out the International
Patent Treaty, rather than by national courts. What national courts will be
asked to determine will be the meaning and scope of the permitted categories
of excluded matter. For instance, a country that legislates to not permit
International Patents concerning business methods to be enforced within its
territory will need to determine what falls within the scope of that excluded
class.
In accordance with this international patentability test, novelty and
inventive step are to be assessed with regard to an absolute or global prior
art base. It is proposed that novelty and inventive step in relation to acts done
be considered in opposition proceedings only rather than in examination.
Ensuring that the prior art base includes acts done, as well as documents,
provides a means of rejecting or opposing an International Patent
Application for want of novelty or inventive step on the grounds that what is
claimed in the application has been done before, or is obvious in light of what
has been done before, even in cases where those acts have not been
documented (which may offer a greater protection from the propertization of

36. Nation states would, of course, have the ability to enter into bilateral or multilateral treaty
obligations that dictate that certain classes of invention will be enforced in the jurisdictions of member
states.
37. 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010).
38. 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
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traditional knowledge by outsiders). In terms of novelty, the system shall be
a first-to-file system.
There is scope for the system to incorporate a grace period. A grace
period excuses any self-publication by the inventor or applicant within a
certain period preceding the filing of a patent application.39
In the interest of achieving an international consensus, the United States
would either need to abandon its best mode requirement (whereby the
description of the invention is to disclose the best mode for carrying out the
invention known to the applicant)40 or convince countries that do not have
an equivalent of its merits. The recent Australian decision of Les
Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd 41 highlights the value of a best mode
(or in the Australian parlance, best method) requirement, being that a failure
to disclose the best mode known to the applicant of performing the invention
potentially leaves a large field for experiment for anyone wishing, say after
the expiry of the statutory monopoly, to achieve the same results as the
applicant has achieved through using the patented invention. That is, in some
cases, a failure to disclose the best mode of performing an invention can in
effect amount to a failure to adequately disclose the invention to an unwitting
public that is saddled with the patentee’s monopoly.
Given the expansive geographic protections recommended in this
article, compulsory licenses will be a necessary feature of the proposed
system. Compulsory licenses must be available where: (1) there has been a
failure to exploit the invention in a jurisdiction in a way that satisfies the
reasonable requirements of the public; and (2) attempts to obtain a license
under reasonable commercial terms have failed.42 This aspect of the proposal
aims to encourage voluntary licensing of patents in places where the inventor
would not ordinarily commercially produce the invention immediately or
promptly. This is not to penalize patentees, but is simply a means of
promoting access to new technologies on equitable terms. It is proposed that
to seek a compulsory license to use an International Patent in a particular
country or countries, a person must apply to a national court after a period of
three years has lapsed since the patent was granted. The amount of
compensation can set by the court, agreed between the patentee and licensee,
or determined through arbitration.

39.
40.
41.
(UK).
42.

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2015).
35 U.S.C.S. § 112 (2008).
[2016] FCAFC 27 (Austl). See also British Dynamite Co v. Krebs [1896] 13 R.P.C. 190, 192
Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. 5(A)(2); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 31.
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The International Patent Treaty should give member states latitude in
determining the circumstances under which compulsory licenses can be used
in response to matters of public health and national emergency. In particular,
they should have a degree of latitude to award compulsory licenses to permit
the importation of pharmaceuticals manufactured in other countries to
address national health emergencies.
It is envisaged that the International Patent Treaty would recognize
rights based on prior use of the invention as a defense to a patent
infringement allegation, in line with the way rights of prior user are
recognized in most countries today. Prior user rights provide a defense to
patent infringement to a person who was using the patented invention before
the patentee filed a patent application or publicly disclosed the invention. 43
For a prior use defense or exception to infringement to apply, the act must
constitute a patent infringement. Non-infringing acts, such as acts done
privately for non-commercial purposes or acts done for experimental
purposes relating to the invention do not constitute a prior use that gives rise
to the defense. Naturally, an act done in public that amounts to an enabling
disclosure is a prior disclosure of the invention, which anticipates the
invention and deprives it of novelty and renders the patent invalid. In this
instance, there would technically be no infringement and the prior user would
be free to use the invention on the basis that the patent is invalid.
Finally, it is not proposed that courts be empowered to award punitive
damages, which are available in cases of willful infringement in the United
States but not elsewhere in the world,44 although this is a matter for member
states to resolve when negotiating the International Patent Treaty. Further, it
is envisaged that the issue of whether criminal sanctions be available for
intentional and commercial-scale patent infringement is to remain a matter
for member states.
2. Harmonization of laws in respect of infringement and remedies
Regardless of which jurisdiction a patent infringement suit is brought
in, International Patents must be considered against the same infringement
rules. The notion of infringement shall be based, as it is now, upon a person
or entity other than the patentee exercising any of the exclusive rights
reserved to the patentee without the patentee’s authorization.45

43. 35 U.S.C § 273 (2011).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
45. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 28, 31; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
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One important issue in respect of enforcement is exhaustion of a
patentee’s rights. In a system in which there are unitary patents of global
effect, a patentee’s rights are logically exhausted when a patented invention
is put on a market with the patentee’s consent, and the patentee has no rights
to prevent products embodying the invention being exported to a new
market. This would create difficulties for International Patents over products
such as pharmaceuticals, for which price discrimination between
jurisdictions is ordinarily employed. In contrast, using a national exhaustion
principle, the patent holder can prevent importation into a different country
by asserting a separate patent in the country into which the product is to be
imported.46 It would thus seem to be necessary for the International Patent
Treaty to provide a means of permitting price discrimination, say between
developed and developing countries (to permit lower prices to be charged for
the product in developing countries).
Uniformity of the remedies available in patent infringement suits is
necessary to facilitate cross-border patent disputes by allowing a court in one
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon patent infringements occurring both within
that court’s territorial jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions. It will also deter
forum shopping.
In addition to the usual remedies of damages or an account of the
defendant’s profits obtained by using the patented invention, it is proposed
that the International Patent Treaty specifically provide national courts with
the power to grant both interlocutory and final injunctions when a defendant
infringes an International Patent in multiple jurisdictions. In these
circumstances, it is proposed that national courts be empowered to order that
the defendant be enjoined from engaging in conduct that infringes an
International Patent, without concern as to whether that enjoined conduct is
likely to occur outside its jurisdiction’s borders. This is an order without
geographic limitation since an International Patent has effect in all member
states.
In the current system, there are two difficulties associated with
injunctions in cross-border cases. The first is that courts are reluctant to grant
injunctions when they have no means of ensuring the defendant’s
compliance with the order. The second is that a court will not grant an
injunction if it believes the terms of that order may cause a conflict with the
laws of the second country.
It is suggested that difficulties of this nature are of limited concern in
this proposal because the effects of substantive law harmonization make it

46. Barton, supra note 1, at 351.
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feasible for the courts in all member states to have the power to enforce each
other’s orders. If a court in Country A grants an injunction prohibiting Party
B from engaging in certain conduct, and Party B travels to Country B and
continues to engage in that conduct, then the courts in Country B will have
personal jurisdiction over Party B and can enforce any injunction awarded
by Country A’s courts.
Given the substantive law harmonization proposed in this article, the
likelihood of an order made by the courts of one country causing a conflict
with the laws of a second country is minimal. The only exception is that the
courts in one member state should not seek to enforce an International Patent
in another member state if the second member state does not allow the
patents of that class to be enforce within its borders (because it has enacted
a permissible subject matter exclusion).
It is also necessary that national courts be empowered to grant
provisional and protective remedies to maintain the status quo pending the
determination of a trial. These might include: orders to prevent an (imminent
or continuing) infringement occurring or continuing to occur (an
interlocutory injunction); orders to preserve relevant evidence in regard to
the alleged infringement; orders to seize goods suspected of infringing; and
orders directing a party to provide information about the location of assets
which are subject to an order. 47
Also required is harmonization of the law in regard to patent claim
construction, which in turn will affect the way in which patent claims are
drafted. In this regard, what is required is that a decision as to whether
International Patents be drafted by means of central claiming (by which the
claims identify the “center” of the patented invention), or peripheral claiming
(where the claims identify the exact periphery or boundary of the patent,
usually by listing its necessary characteristics).48 What is essential in this
regard is that patents and patent enforcement laws be uniformly interpreted
by national courts.49 It is also proposed that nation states implement a legal
requirement that their courts enforce a doctrine of equivalents, 50 although
this will naturally be a point of negotiation for member states.51

47. European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Principles for
Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Art. 2:501(3), www.imprs-ci.ip.mpg.de/_www/files/pdf2/draftclip-principles-25-03-20117.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
48. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1743-47 (2009).
49. See generally TRIMBLE, supra note 1.
50. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948).
51. Burk & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1763.
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C. Enforcement in National Courts
This third part of the proposal is that enforcement and related matters
remain the exclusive concern of member states and their courts. The role of
national courts will be to hear infringement proceedings, proceedings in
which declarations of non-infringement are sought and proceedings in which
claims for unjustified threats of patent infringement are made. As a
consequence, the International Patent Court will have no power to adjudicate
in respect of these matters. As noted previously, the role of the International
Patent Court will be limited to adjudicating on matters of patent validity.
There are several reasons for favoring national courts for these tasks.
Firstly, investing national courts with these powers allows litigants to access
courts that are geographically proximate to their business activities and
where they live, and which have familiar procedures. Secondly, this allows
member states the flexibility to maintain subject matter exclusions within
their territories. Finally, it is considered that the establishment of a world
patent court with enforcement powers is a bridge too far at this time given
nation states’ desires to maintain national sovereignty.52 This approach is
arguably preferable to an international court comprised of regional divisions
that may develop regional peculiarities that lead to a lack of consistency
across divisions.
An important aspect of this part of the proposal is that, with some
exceptions, national courts will have the power to hear and determine crossborder patent infringement suits where the acts of infringement are alleged
to have occurred not just within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, but also
outside. It is also proposed that, in addition to the power to make awards of
damages or account of profits in respect of foreign infringements, those
courts be expressly given the power to grant both interlocutory and final
injunctions of extraterritorial effect that will be recognized outside their
borders.53
Ensuring that national courts are empowered to hear cross-border patent
disputes overcomes some of the significant difficulties patentees who seek
to enforce their patents in many jurisdictions currently face. It is at present
difficult to enforce a patent outside the country in which it was granted
because many courts generally decline to consider questions that arise in
relation to foreign patents. Many courts generally refuse to adjudicate claims
52. This is not a view that is shared by all, see Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 14, at 546-48.
53. In some places this happens already. Courts in the Netherlands have issued extraterritorial
injunctions in response to the infringement of foreign patents in foreign countries using a procedure
known as kort geding: see CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-20 (1998).
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that a foreign patent has been infringed because the patent can only be
enforced if it is valid, which brings the patent’s validity into issue. Patent
validity is often pleaded in a counterclaim for revocation or as a defense. 54
This proposal avoids the current need for a multiplicity of proceedings by
removing the territorial nexus of patents, coupled with the substantive law
harmonization it achieves (in terms of patentability standards and the law in
respect of infringement and remedies). This substantive law harmonization
facilitates the resolution of cross-border infringement disputes in a single
court because it removes any possibility of a conflict of laws arising, and
thus obviates any need for a court to apply either choice of law rules or
foreign law, other than in respect of patentable subject matter exclusions a
foreign state may have imposed.
It is proposed that the International Patent Treaty set out rules governing
the way cross-border disputes are managed, coordinated and enforced
between the courts in member states. The rules will govern:
(a) jurisdiction, including the circumstances in which a national court
may assume jurisdiction in a multi-national cross-border patent
infringement suit, and any circumstances in which it must decline
to exercise jurisdiction;
(b) a court’s power to grant a stay when a defendant claims in
infringement proceedings that the International Patent being
asserted is invalid;
(c) the coordination of parallel proceedings involving the same parties
and issues;
(d) recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and
(e) the management of litigation involving patent infringement claims
and other non-patent claims.
The aims of these rules must be to, firstly, prevent a multiplicity of
parallel proceedings in respect of the same International Patent in several
national courts (and in doing so, remove the possibility of courts in different
member states rendering irreconcilable decisions). Secondly, the rules must
facilitate the mutual recognition and enforcement of decisions rendered by
courts in member states. Each will be considered in turn as follows.

54. Jan K. Voda, M.D. v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Stein Assocs, Inc. v.
Heat & Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Only a British court, applying British law, can
determine validity and infringement of British patents.”); Potter v. Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1906] 3 C.L.R.
479, 479 (Austl.); Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co KG (GAT) v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau
Beteiligungs KG (LuK) [2006] E.C.R. I-6509, I-6529-30 (Ger.).
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1. Jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
The proposed International Patent Treaty requires definitive rules for
establishing personal jurisdiction in matters involving an International
Patent, regardless of the forum in which the matter is heard. These are rules
that are to be applied when deciding whether a national court has jurisdiction
to hear and determine a dispute involving an International Patent. These rules
should exclude the operation of national laws within any member state that
are relevant to establishing personal jurisdiction. The International Patent
Treaty should also provide rules that govern the circumstances under which
a court in a member state must recognize the judgment of a foreign member
state in a matter involving an International Patent.
The rules regarding personal jurisdiction will be necessarily tailored to
a defendant’s convenience. For obvious reasons, a defendant will usually
prefer to be sued where he or she resides or where the facts giving rise to the
plaintiff’s lawsuit occurred – and principles of fairness dictate that this be so.
While it is not desirable to formulate precise rules for the purposes of this
article, it is proposed that (at a minimum) a national court only have personal
jurisdiction in a matter involving an International Patent if the defendant has
“sufficient minimal contacts” with the forum state, such that the proceeding
does not offend notions of fairness and justice. This formulation mirrors the
notion of personal jurisdiction described in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.55 Such minimal contacts should likely include consideration of
matters such as the defendant’s domicile or habitual residence, the
defendant’s center of operations, places where the defendant sells products
or provides services, and the place where the infringing activity occurred. If
an expansive concept of personal jurisdiction of this kind is adopted, it is
envisaged that the International Patent Treaty will not need a provision
enabling a form of “long-arm” jurisdiction, which is a means of empowering
courts to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. The rules
establishing a court’s jurisdiction will also need to take into account the
possibility of an action involving multiple defendants.
It is further proposed that the International Patent Treaty contain a
provision which stipulates that a defendant can object to the plaintiff’s choice
of forum on the ground that it is an inappropriate venue for the hearing of
the dispute, even though the court may validly assert personal jurisdiction.
This provision should stipulate the matters to be considered in determining
whether a plaintiff’s chosen forum is inappropriate. Those matters can be
taken from the existing law in respect of forum non conveniens, and arguably
55. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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ought be based on the factors described in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd.56 The approach adopted in that case was that a stay of
proceedings will only be granted where there is a more appropriate forum
available for the trial of the action, and that a continuation in the forum would
be oppressive or vexatious. It is not sufficient to show that the forum court
is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial. A natural forum for a
dispute is one in which the action has a real and substantial connection. 57
The International Patent Treaty should further stipulate that a national
court will have jurisdiction if the defendant proceeds on the merits without
contesting the court’s jurisdiction, and that the defendant has the right to
contest jurisdiction no later than the time he or she files a first defense on the
merits. It should also stipulate that, if defendant does not appear to contest
the merits at trial, the court may enter judgment in his or her absence,
provided that it is satisfied that the plaintiff’s assertions that the court has
jurisdiction have merit. Otherwise, the procedural rules in the forum state
will apply to determine how the proceeding is to be conducted.
Finally, the International Patent Treaty will need to stipulate the
circumstances under which a party can enforce a foreign judgment in respect
of an International Patent in the courts of a member state. Those
circumstances, at a minimum, should be that: (1) the judgment was not
obtained fraudulently; (2) the parties had an opportunity to be heard in the
court in which the judgment was obtained; and (3) the foreign court had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
In terms of subject matter jurisdiction, a court in a member state that
has jurisdiction in respect of patents will necessarily have the power to hear
matters involving an International Patent, other than matters relating to
validity. However, it may happen that patent infringement claims are pleaded
in conjunction with contract (or other related) claims in a single proceeding.
In most instances, it will be desirable for one court to have jurisdiction over
the infringement claims as well as the related claims. Consequently, it is
proposed that the International Patent Treaty provide that courts in member
states have jurisdiction to hear infringement claims that arising out of a
contractual relationship concerning the International Patent in question, and
that resulting decisions be recognized in other member states.

56. [1987] A.C. 460 (UK).
57. Id. at 476.
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2. Defendants claiming invalidity in infringement proceedings
Given this proposal’s separation of the roles of national courts to
conduct enforcement proceedings and the International Patent Office to
conduct opposition proceedings where an International Patent’s validity has
been challenged, there must be a means of managing those proceedings when
a defendant challenges the validity of an International Patent in a proceeding
before a national court.
If a defendant challenges an International Patent’s validity in a
proceeding before a national court, and the court forms the view that the
challenge appears to have merit, the national proceeding is to be stayed while
the challenge to validity is referred to an expedited post-grant revocation
hearing by the review panel of the International Patent Office. The national
court’s stay shall remain in place until the result of the International Patent
Office’s review is relayed to the court. As decisions of the International
Patent Office are subject to appeal to the International Patent Court, the stay
shall remain in place until any appeal to International Patent Court on matters
of patentability is determined or the time period in which a party can seek
such an appeal has expired, whichever occurs first.
To ensure that validity challenges do not unnecessarily delay
infringement proceedings, it is proposed that a limit of 60 days be imposed,
within which a party asserting that an International Patent is invalid must
seek an expedited opposition hearing by the review panel of the International
Patent Office.
A national court’s decision to grant a stay affects only the proceeding
before it and it does not prevent a person mounting a validity challenge in
the International Patent Office if the national court does not grant the stay. If
a court refuses to grant a stay when one is requested and proceeds to consider
the question of infringement, the court’s decision is subject to any later
decision on validity handed down by the International Patent Office or the
International Patent Court on appeal. In essence, this means that if the court
rules that there has been an infringement, but the patent is later revoked, the
court’s decision will be nullified. In any event, a court that declines the grant
of a stay in the face of a validity challenge being mounted before the review
panel of the International Patent Office must stay any judgment it enters in
favor of a patentee. In urgent matters, a national court does not necessarily
need to delay its proceeding by issuing a stay when a challenge to the patent’s
validity is raised; it might proceed to consider the infringement allegation at
trial and simply stay the enforcement of its final decision until the
International Patent Office’s review of the patent has run its course and the
appeal period has expired. Otherwise, the national court might make a final
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ruling on the condition that the plaintiff undertake to compensate the
defendant for any loss suffered as a consequence of the plaintiff exercising
its rights in the judgment if the patent is later ruled to be invalid. This aspect
of the proposal removes the threat of Italian or Belgian “torpedoes,” which
are invalidity proceedings in which declaratory judgment is sought, that are
purposely filed in slow courts for the purpose of delaying faster courts in
rendering decisions on infringement. 58
In urgent matters, such as interlocutory matters, a national court can
grant injunctive relief before a review of the patent’s validity takes place
upon an undertaking as to damages,59 or a suitable security or bond, being
given by the plaintiff.60 Any award of injunctive relief does not need to be
stayed in the event that a challenge to the validity of the International Patent
in question is commenced.
3. Coordination of parallel proceedings involving the same parties and
issues
The proposal requires a means of coordinating parallel infringement
proceedings in national courts. The system must be capable of dealing with
circumstances of lis alibi pendens. This is a situation in which there are
concurrent proceedings involving the same subject matter pending between
the same parties in different jurisdictions at the same time.
It is proposed that the International Patent Treaty contain a provision to
the effect that the court first seized of jurisdiction has priority in all matters
other than in cases involving an abuse of process. This emulates the position
under the Brussels-I-Regulation.61 Courts later seized must stay their
proceedings and await the determination of the court first seized, unless it is
manifest that the judgment of the court first seized will not be recognized in
the jurisdiction of the court later seized. For example, where Party A brings
suit in Country A alleging that unjustified threats have been made, and later
Party B brings suit in Country B alleging infringement, a lis pendens

58. For an explanation as to what Italian or Belgian “torpedoes” are see: David Kenny & Rosemary
Hennigan, Choice-Of-Court Agreements, the Italian Torpedo, and the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation,
64 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 197, 199 (2015).
59. An undertaking as to damages is a promise to pay appropriate compensation for any injury
caused by these measures for which the undertaking is provided.
60. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 22, art. 50(3).
61. Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (l12) 1 (EC). See also Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Dec. 21, 2007, O.J. (L 339) 11.
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situation arises and the first-in-time principle applies and the first proceeding
takes precedence.
Finally, once a national court with jurisdiction to hear an infringement
suit issues a final decision, that issue becomes res judicata and the plaintiff
is then estopped from bringing that issue before another court.
4. Capacity of national courts to handle patent litigation
Although fairness requires that infringement proceedings be conducted
in a forum that is convenient for the alleged infringer, not all national courts
are capable of managing the complexities and difficulties of patent litigation.
Further, not all legal systems are reliable and not all member states will agree
to accede to a system that potentially places their nationals at the mercy of
orders emanating from foreign court systems that are perceived as being
unreliable. For this reason, it is proposed that in some instances, special
regional patent courts comprised of international patent experts be
established to conduct the workload of some countries’ patent litigation. The
alternative is that only certain existing national courts that are part of an
internationally trusted legal system be granted the right to entertain crossborder patent disputes, and that other national courts only have the power to
hear and determine disputes concerns allegations of infringement occurring
within their own borders.
D. Language
As noted above, the major impediment to the establishment of a truly
international patent system is language – namely, the need to reach a
diplomatic consensus that addresses the practical necessity to designate a
language in which patent applications are drafted, published, examined and
challenged. Thus, the most contentious aspect of this proposal is its
recommendation to adopt English as the one and only official language of
the international patent system.62
There are prominent concerns in this regard. The first is the need to be
wary of placing language barriers in the way of those who wish to obtain
patent protection, particularly those who, in the absence of this proposal,
would only seek patent protection in their country of residence and perhaps
neighboring countries where the same language is spoken. The second is to

62. This proposal is not alone in this regard, as other authors have proposed English as the only
language of an international patent system but make no mention of the possibilities of reliable machine
translation. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 14, at 551-52. Meller, supra note 3, at 384.

196

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 16:167

not unfairly disadvantage those alleged of patent infringement by having the
patent specifications written in a language that is incomprehensible to them.
In relation to the first of these issues, it is proposed that the International
Patent Office use only one language because it is unwieldy for more than
one to be used. Even using a selection of languages, as the EPO does, is
unwieldy (the EPO uses three official languages – English, French and
German).63
English is the obvious choice to be the one and only official language
of the international patent system. It is the global lingua franca of science
and is the primary language of scholarship throughout a world that is in many
ways dominated economically, scientifically and culturally by AngloAmerican countries. 64 English was described by The Economist in 1996 as
being “impregnably established as the world standard language: an intrinsic
part of the global communications revolution.”65 David Graddol has
predicted that no other language will rival English as the dominant world
language in the 21st century. 66
English is a truly international language. Although English is not the
most widely spoken language on Earth, today it is the first language of about
400 million people and the second language of as many as 1.4 billion more.67
English is the logical choice because it has been the internationally dominant
language through the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries as a
result of the political, economic and cultural might of Britain and the United
States during that time in the way that languages such as Greek, Latin, Arabic
and Spanish and French were in earlier times. 68 Moreover, David Crystal has
expressed the view that the prevalence of international collaboration renders
it necessary that the world adopt a global lingua franca as a “working
language” to cut down the impracticalities of multi-way translations. 69

63. Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 14, Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (European patent applications shall
be filed in one of the official languages or, if filed in any other language, translated into one of the official
languages in accordance with the Implementing Regulations).
64. DAVID GRADDOL, THE FUTURE OF ENGLISH? A GUIDE TO FORECASTING THE POPULARITY IF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 5-9 (The English Co. 1997); Donna E. Cromer, English:
The Lingua Franca of International Scientific Communication, 12 SCI. & TECH. LIB. 21, 21-23 (1991);
DAVID CRYSTAL, ENGLISH AS A GLOBAL LANGUAGE 68-69 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd ed., 2003).
65. Language and Electronics: The Coming Global Tongue, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1996, at 78.
66. GRADDOL, supra note 64, at 58.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 9-10.
69. Id. at 12.
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Furthermore, English has more cultural resources in the form of literary
works, films and television programs than any other language. 70 Likewise,
authors of scientific works place great emphasis on publication in
international journals with an attractive impact factor, most of which are
English-language journals. 71 Some countries are actively taking steps to
publish their scientific works in English. “China, for example, has an
agreement with the German publisher Springer . . . to select the best articles
from more than 1,700 Chinese [scholarly] university journals and translate
them into English.”72 “Similarly, Czech, Hungarian and South Korean
journals [that have been] indexed by Thomson Scientific . . . are almost all
published in English.”73 As a consequence, most prior art documents that are
relevant to the issue of whether a claimed invention is novel or involves an
inventive step are likely to be written in English.
Another benefit of the English language is that it is an official language
of two of the “big four” patent offices, namely the USPTO and the EPO. In
addition, both the Japanese and Chinese patent offices require their patent
examiners to be fluent in English.74 Thus, there are already a large number
of experienced patent examiners and other patent office staffers who are
native speakers or who have professional experience in using the English
language.
Although choosing the English language will only further entrench its
dominant position as the global language of science and commerce, doing so
will make some head way in solving the problem of uncovering the “lost”
science hidden in languages unfamiliar to the English-speaking scientific
community.75
Many commentators who seek this kind of procedural efficiency
advocate reversing the EU’s present commitment to multilingualism in favor
of adopting English as lingua franca. Jürgen Habermas sees the EU’s policies
of “linguistic diversity . . . as a hindrance to economic progress or political
integration and real democracy.”.76 Similarly, Theo van Els has explained

70. GRADDOL, supra note 64, at 2.
71. Rogerio Meneghini & Abel L. Packer, Is there Science Beyond English?, 8 EMBO REPS. 112,
113 (2007).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 14, at 552.
75. See generally W. Wayt Gibbs, Lost Science in the Third World, 273 SCI. AM. 92 (1995);
Meneghini & Packer, supra note 71, at 113.
76. Ulrich Ammon, Language Conflicts in the European Union, 16 INT’L JOURNAL OF APPLIED
LINGUISTICS 319, 322 (2006) (stating Jurgen Habermas, a German sociologist and philosopher, supports
the idea of a single institutional working language, and has proposed English as the necessary unifying
language).
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that making English the sole working language of the EU holds advantages
for non-native English speakers. 77 The first is that non-native speakers “need
to develop competence in one foreign language only.”78 The second is that
“this one foreign language will also become – and to an increasing extent –
the property of the non-natives” and that “[i]f they constitute a large
majority, as in the EU, they will, without doubt, use the working language as
their language and share in the fashioning of this language to meet their own
needs.”79 However, van Els posits that, “this appropriation of the working
language by non-natives does not take place when there are two or more
working languages, and in that case native speakers would not need to give
up the ownership of their language.”80
Machine translation technology is advancing at such a prodigious rate,
it is anticipated that the difficulties of language translation will be a thing of
the past by the time any treaty implementing this proposal can be made.
Currently, machine translation technology is imperfect and the production of
reliable translations of complex text containing technical subject matter still
requires significant and time-consuming human input. Presently, machine
translations are useful for getting a general idea of a text, but are not able to
create a precise translation. Translations of complex technical documents,
such as patent specifications, still require significant and time-consuming
human involvement. However, many companies are making significant
advances in this field. Google, Inc. (“Google”) offers translation
technologies through its Google translate products. 81 It is about to launch a
real-time translation service for Skype. 82 Then there is the joint initiative of
the EPO and Google called Patent Translate that provides translations “from
English, French and German into any of the 28 official languages of the
EPO’s 38 member states, and vice versa, plus from Chinese, Japanese,
Korean and Russian into English, and vice versa.”83
This aspect of the proposal will not unfairly disadvantage those alleged
of patent infringement by having the patent specifications written in a
language that is foreign to them because machine translations of

77. See Theo van Els, Multilingualism in the European Union, 15 INT’L JOURNAL OF APPLIED
LINGUISTICS 263, 275-78 (2005).
78. Id. at 276.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. E.g., GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://translate.google.com/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
82. E.g., SKYPE, http://www.skype.com/en/translator-preview/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
83. See
EUROPEAN
PATENT
OFFICE,
https://worldwide.espacenet.com/help?locale=en_EP&method=handleHelpTopic&topic=translation
(last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
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International Patents will be available from the International Patent Office’s
website. Enforcement proceedings will be conducted in national courts in the
official language of the place where the court is located. Depending on the
rules of procedure in the forum, this may, require a translation of the patent
into an official language of the country in which the court is located in the
event that that language is not English. Otherwise, those courts are free to
consider the English-language specification.
To ensure fairness and transparency in the system, the accuracy of a
patent translation can be challenged in an administrative proceeding before
the International Patent Office. The International Patent Office can then
order that changes be made to a translation or that the translation be removed
and re-filed. Such a challenge will be grounds for a stay of court proceedings
and possibly limit the scope of the International Patent concerned in any
jurisdictions affected by the incorrect translation.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
It is envisaged that the International Patent Office would be operated by
the World Intellectual Property Organization or a new international
organization created specifically for this purpose.
A. Funding and Staffing
The initial funding of the International Patent Office and the
International Patent Court would be provided by member states. The
countries that believe there is a need for an integrated international patent
system, and can afford to do so, will meet the initial establishment costs of
the new system.
The on-going costs of the International Patent Office and International
Patent Court are to be funded by the patent filing fees and maintenance fees
paid by patent applicants. These fees need to be modest to ensure that all
inventors have reasonable access to the international patent system. It is
proposed that these fees be comparable to the filing and maintenance fees
currently applicable to a small number of national applications.84 It is
proposed that there be two tiers of fees: (1) large corporate entities that are
heavy users of the patent system (e.g., corporations and their associated
entities that together have more than 500 employees); and (2) applicants who
do not fall into this category.
84. By way of example, the USPTO’s current filing and patent maintenance fees are set out at:
USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
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It is not suggested that the International Patent Office be a source of
revenue in the way that some national patent offices are currently. 85 Rather,
its fee structure should be designed to recoup costs so as to minimize its
contribution to the cost of obtaining a patent.
It is proposed that the International Patent Office be responsible for
training of examiners, patent review panels, and other patent office staff.
Further, it is proposed that International Patent Office also be responsible for
the registration of patent attorneys or agents, and the accreditation of
universities providing the necessary qualifications for those professions.
B. Commencement and Transitional Arrangements
The proposed system will only be feasible if it has a significant number
of members. Accordingly, the International Patent Treaty will enter into
force once thirty states ratify it. The world’s three most patent intensive
countries, China, Japan, and the United States, along with the three most
patent intensive states in Europe, Germany, France and the United Kingdom,
must be among the states that have ratified the International Patent Treaty
before it will enter into force.
Previously granted national patents will remain in force and will be
regulated and enforced according to national law until they expire, are
revoked, or otherwise cease to exist or have effect.
As a transitional matter, all applicants seeking national patents which
are filed prior to the commencement of the proposed international patent
system will continue as national applications and will result in the grant of a
national patent, unless the applicant elects to convert a national patent
application into an International Patent Application, which can be done
before any national patent is granted in respect of the invention.
CONCLUSION
Since the formation of the Paris Convention in 1884, the world has
slowly but inexorably been moving towards an integrated world patent
system. The patent system is evolving from solely being a matter of domestic
legislative and administrative concern to one that involves significant
multilateral cooperation in a global, connected and integrated world. This
proposal is an extension of this evolution. In recent times, that evolution has
seen the advent of streamlined workload sharing arrangements between the

85. Barton, supra note 1, at 352; See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, NW.
U.L. REV., Feb. 2001, at 1, 25 n.94.
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trilateral offices of the EPO, the JPO and the USPTO, and also arrangements
between those offices and other national patent offices. As former Director
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, James E. Rogan noted,
pressure is mounting on national patent offices with more and more patent
applications being filed each year to reach the objective of a truly
international patent system.86
While there are many obstacles to substantive patent law
harmonization, both political and economic,87 the three core pillars of the
proposed global patent system build upon advantageous structures and
practices that have been established in domestic legal systems to date. The
aims of the proposal are: (1) to make global patenting more accessible; (2)
to improve patent quality and the availability of patent and prior art
information; and (3) to improve the efficiency of patent enforcement by
allowing cross-border patent disputes to be consolidated in national courts.
The path to achieving an integrated global patent system will be a
gradual one. Realistically, forming a global patent system of the kind
proposed in this article might not be best achieved by conducting
negotiations between all possible member states in a UN-like forum, but
instead between a few select countries that are especially interested in patent
rights. Michael Meller has made the same suggestion, noting that “the 1883
Paris Convention was arrived at” by achieving consensus among “patent
conscious countries” before being later adopted across the world.88 Today’s
“most patent conscious” countries arguably include, at a minimum, the
United States, China, Japan, and European countries, which together produce
90% of the world’s patents. The best means forward might be for the
proposal to be initially adopted in a small number of technologically
advanced developed countries.
Alternatively, it might be that the “global” patent system proposed in
this article be adopted only by a subset of the world’s countries, while others
that do not subscribe to its aims or contents could maintain their existing
systems or form other alliances. In that case, as John Duffy has put it,
“having four or five competing patent systems may be better than having one
hundred.”89

86. James E. Rogan, Dir., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Global Recognition of Patent Rights
(Mar. 26, 2002).
87. See Anthony D. Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization, 22
N. KY. L. REV. 579 (1995).
88. Meller, supra note 3, at 382; See Michael N. Meller, Principles of Patentability and Some Other
Basics for a Global Patent System, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 359, 361 (2001).
89. Duffy, supra note 10, at 691.
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In any event, a single, fully integrated, and harmonized world patent
system of the kind proposed is needed because traders and consumers around
the world rely on trade in global markets. The benefits of a fully integrated
international patent system lie in efficiency. Obtaining and enforcing patents
must not be prohibitively expensive if we are to take full advantage of the
incentives to innovate that patents provide, obtaining and enforcing them
must not be prohibitively expensive. While the initial costs of obtaining
global patent protection remain excessive, the patent incentive is illusory for
those who lack the necessary start-up capital or cannot access it through
investors. Until these deficiencies are remedied by the introduction of a
properly integrated international arrangement, the patent system will fail to
deliver its full potential.

